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FORUM
The Thirty Years War
The Thirty Years War (1618–1648) remains a defining event in early modern European 
history generally, and in German history more particularly. It is still widely consid-
ered to mark major political, religious, military and socio-economic transitions. For 
Europe, the foremost of  these is the alleged shift from an ‘age of  religious wars’, sup-
posedly characterizing the period since the Reformation, to an era defined more by 
dynasticism and disputes over territory and status. Warfare was supposedly ‘tamed’ by 
more centralized states which now maintained permanent ‘standing armies’, rather 
than relying on ‘rootless mercenaries’ as before 1648. Several decades of  research have 
undermined the characterization of  the period 1648–1789 as an ‘age of  absolutism’, 
but political power is still widely seen as shifting from aristocrats and local elites to 
become more concentrated in central, monarchical institutions. These institutions pro-
vided greater internal stability for states, and, in turn, the increased domestic polit-
ical strength supported a more stable international order. German history is widely 
regarded as partially following this broader European transition wrought by the war. 
Though the exact scale of  destruction remains controversial, all are agreed that the 
war severely disrupted the previous social and political order within the Holy Roman 
Empire, terminating some trends and radically redirecting others. There is now con-
siderable evidence that the Empire was not reduced to a meaningless shell, as older 
accounts maintained, but instead remained flexible and even capable of  further pol-
itical development. Nonetheless, the conventional idea that power shifted irrevocably 
from Imperial institutions to the princely territories continues to shape research, not 
just into political affairs, but also on social, cultural and economic history.
In 1998, the 350th anniversary of  the Peace of  Westphalia was marked by a number 
of  major public exhibitions and important scholarly publications which broadly pre-
sented the settlement in a positive light, whilst nonetheless relativizing some of  the 
more extravagant claims in the older literature for its status as a decisive ‘turning point’ 
in world history. It is perhaps always easier to commemorate a peace than to mark the 
anniversary of  a war’s outbreak. While the Westphalian peace is no longer regarded 
by the broader German public as a national humiliation, the Thirty Years War that 
it settled is still remembered as a catastrophe, and it is likely that this impression will 
be reinforced during the 400th anniversary of  the conflict’s conventionally accepted 
starting point in the Defenestration of  Prague, which will be marked in 2018. The par-
allel centenary of  the First World War, which has continued since 2014, has certainly 
generated a fruitful debate on how that conflict should be interpreted, even if  some 
of  the new insights have not yet altered the media’s representation of  the war. The 
2018 anniversary thus offers a suitable moment to take stock of  the current state of  
scholarship on the Thirty Years War and to consider where future work might lead. To 
this end, the editors of  this Forum invited Sigrun Haude (Cincinnati), Christoph 
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Kampmann (Marburg), Gunner Lind (Copenhagen), Mario Rizzo (Pavia) and 
Anuschka Tischer (Würzburg) to reflect on four enduring issues associated with the 
war, and to consider the historical methodologies underpinning the more recent re-
search. The Forum was jointly convened by Peter H. Wilson (Oxford) and David 
Parrott (Oxford).
1. Was the Thirty Years War inevitable? Or at least, was a conflict of  
this scale and duration inevitable? What do the responses to this issue tell 
us about the current thinking on the relative balance between agency and 
structure in historical research?
Tischer: I don’t think that any war has ever been inevitable. The outbreak of  war 
is caused by human activity, and the outbreak of  the Thirty Years War was caused 
by notable individuals, i.e. the Bohemian rebel leaders on the one side, and the fu-
ture Emperor Ferdinand II and his counsellors and supporters on the other. In the 
decade before 1618, many people were well aware of  tensions and some leading fig-
ures tried to alleviate the situation. For example, the electors of  Saxony, Christian II, 
who died in 1611, and his son and successor, John George, refused to take part in 
the Protestant Union or in any revolt, although they were traditional leaders of  the 
German Protestants. At the Habsburg court, Cardinal Khlesl, a representative of  the 
Counter-Reformation in Austria, worked for a compromise with the Protestants in the 
Empire. Moreover, neither Maximilian of  Bavaria’s use of  force against the Imperial 
city of  Donauwörth in 1607 nor the Jülich-Cleves succession crises between 1609 and 
1614 led directly to war in 1618. Once the Thirty Years War broke out, there were not 
just three decades of  military action and confrontation, but also numerous negotia-
tions. In my view, the war’s outbreak owed much to there being the wrong men in the 
wrong place at the wrong time: men who insisted stubbornly on what they regarded as 
their right and who were ready to fight for it; moreover, men whose convictions were 
mixed with ambition, such as Frederick V of  the Palatinate, who tried to become king 
of  Bohemia.
Admittedly, the complex political and legal situation in the Holy Roman Empire 
and in Europe offered potential enough for war. The Emperor sought power but had 
limited means of  enforcement, whereas the estates who counterbalanced him were not 
homogenous and struggled with each other. The attempt to resolve religious conflict in 
the Peace of  Augsburg (1555) had created several legal ambiguities, notably the eccle-
siastical reservation intended by the Habsburgs to preserve the lands of  the Imperial 
church for Catholics. Meanwhile, the Habsburgs were widely regarded as a threat, not 
only in the Empire, but across Europe. There were other dynastic rivalries, as well as 
more generally unfavourable conditions like the Little Ice Age which intensified eco-
nomic difficulties. Many people obviously anticipated a confrontation, an expectation 
fuelled by the growing print media. Thus, a war could have broken out sooner or later, 
even if  there had been a smooth solution to the problems in Bohemia.
Those who were responsible for the war’s outbreak all had experience of  war and 
politics. Ferdinand II clearly spelt out in his published declaration against the Bohemian 
rebels that death, ruin and atrocities would follow from armed conflict. The opposing 
parties obviously accepted these dire consequences.
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None of  them, of  course, had any idea just how bad things would be or what kind 
of  vicious circle of  violence they had initiated. When the various latent conflicts burst 
out, it became extremely difficult to return to peace. Even today, historians struggle to 
disentangle the numerous conflicts in this war and the multitude of  elements which 
determined them. Thus, it is no surprise that the men who began the war did not have 
an overview of  what might happen. Nevertheless, they were responsible for the war, 
even though I would affirm that it was a confused situation which combined with a 
widespread and socially accepted readiness to use violence that prompted the outbreak.
Haude: While earlier scholarship drew a straight line from 1555 to 1618 and argued 
that the Peace of  Augsburg inevitably set up the later conflict, historians now widely chal-
lenge this interpretation, and for good reasons. The former approach had emphasized the 
shortcomings of  the 1555 settlement, which, it was argued, heightened the Holy Roman 
Empire’s fragmentation by adding religious to political divisions, whereas historians more 
recently have drawn attention to the impressive longevity of  the treaty and to concerted 
efforts on both sides to make the peace work. In this important shift of  historical perspec-
tive, which has much to do with changes in political climates, the Holy Roman Empire 
morphed from a fragmented, ungovernable entity into an impressive federation of  states 
ahead of  its time. This reassessment represents more than a change in perspective—that is, 
looking at the glass as half  full rather than half  empty—because it pays attention to forces 
that have largely been overlooked or disregarded. In this argumentation, the widespread 
and shared interest among the Imperial estates in upholding the constitution, as it was 
interpreted in Augsburg, holds centre stage. In the decades after 1555, the treaty served 
more as plumb line than as point of  contention for the estates, and continued to do so for 
the Protestant Union in 1608 and the Catholic League in 1609, all the way up to the Peace 
of  Westphalia. As a rule, the constituent parts of  the Empire preferred peace over war.
With regard to current thinking on the relative balance of  agency and structure, 
historians are more divided, although many foreground structural factors over human 
agency by arguing that realities of  military operations outweighed whatever brilliance 
might be possessed by strategic commanders.
Structural issues also influenced the war’s scale and duration. Both Denmark and 
Sweden lacked the resources to end the conflict once they had intervened. Moreover, 
issues over interpretation of  the constitution continued to be proffered as reasons for 
going to war. Even though in the interplay of  structures and human agency the former 
may win the day, the latter ought not to be discounted. Personal factors could trump 
structures if  conditions were right (or wrong, depending on one’s point of  view), as 
they were before the outbreak of  war, when the emperors became too weak to govern 
effectively. In his German Histories in the Age of  Reformations, 1400–1650 (2009), Thomas 
A. Brady, Jr. showed the interaction of  structure and personalities. Importantly, giving 
political, constitutional and operational structures too much or exclusive play also runs 
the risk of  viewing the conflict solely in terms of  its major leaders and forces. More re-
cent studies on the war’s social dimensions try to move beyond operational and strategic 
thinking towards the role of  the populace during the conflict. Rather than disregard-
ing large segments of  the population or viewing the people merely as victims of  larger 
forces and (ruthless or hapless) commanders, these studies highlight people’s agency as 
they responded to the war’s challenges.
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Kampmann: At no time was the path into war irreversible, nor was escalation 
inevitable once the conflict had begun. Before 1618 almost all the major political and 
confessional actors tried to avoid war, and thereafter no party aimed at its enemy’s total 
destruction or to impose a confessional absolutism (or indeed any other values). On the 
contrary, all belligerents remained capable of  political dialogue.
Therefore, modernizing phrases like confessional ‘fundamentalism’ are unsuitable 
to define the positions of  the protagonists during the war. Nothing demonstrates this 
more clearly than the fact that no party was prepared to go to war or even felt prepared 
for war. War and its escalation were seen as dangerous by all participants. For example, 
at the beginning of  the conflict both the Emperor and his Bohemian adversaries knew 
very well that they did not have the necessary means to make war.
Of  course, this raises the question of  why the war broke out and why it escalated re-
peatedly. The answer has much to do with the general attitude towards war, which was 
seen as a possibility and an option by all parties. All felt entitled to make war, not only 
against foreign sovereigns, but also (within the Empire) against other Imperial estates. 
The latter can be seen as the worst consequence of  the growing confessional confronta-
tion and constitutional decay of  the Empire around 1600. In my view, the crucial point 
is that there was widespread fear that the enemy was only waiting for the right moment 
to take military action. Therefore, a key phrase in all internal discussions was praevenire, 
to forestall. We must defend ourselves before it is too late—this attitude characterized 
the position of  the Bohemian ‘rebels’ in May 1618, as well as the Palatinate in July/
August 1619, and the Emperor in 1624/25 and 1629. As the war developed, this atti-
tude (now expressed as ‘react now to prevent future evils’) shaped policy towards peace 
as well. There was widespread concern that a peace based on significant concessions by 
one’s own side might be regarded as humiliating and a severe blow to one’s own repu-
tation, and the longer the war lasted the more firmly this concern became established. 
Only an ‘acceptable’ peace could ensure a safe postwar position.
To my mind, the change of  attitude in recent historiography towards the inevitability 
of  the war has little to do with thinking on the balance between agency and struc-
ture. The older historiography stressed the importance of  individual military and pol-
itical decisions—in terms of  individual people (‘great men’) making history. But exactly 
this older (German) historiography considered the war a necessary outcome of  the 
long-lasting fragmentation and decay of  the ‘German’ Empire. Recent research has 
attached greater importance to the structural conditions in which individual decisions 
were taken. Yet even though a structuralist approach underpins this research, the war’s 
outbreak and escalation are not seen as inevitable.
Lind: Nothing is inevitable until it happens. We can imagine a landscape of  risk like 
the insurance companies do, composed of  a range of  possibilities with a probability 
assigned to each. But it is even more complex when discussing history. Possibilities and 
probabilities change with our viewpoint in time. Do we look at the Thirty Years War 
from one, five, ten or fifty years before its outbreak? The outlook changes as we shift our 
imagined vantage point, even if  we restrict ourselves to a reasonable human timescale. 
That said, we can look at the tensions nudging people towards war. They include hos-
tility between the confessions, rival interests concerning the German constitution, and 
relations to the mighty House of  Austria, all viewed through the lenses of  pride, greed 
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and fear. Many greater and lesser wars arose from these tensions over a long period, 
both before and after the Thirty Years War. It would have been a safe prophecy in 1610 
or 1600, or even quite a bit further back, that yet another big war was not very far away 
and would connect two or more of  these elements.
I am less sure that a conflict of  this extraordinary scale and duration was likely. It 
was even unlikely far into the war. From 1621 until 1630 the Protestant side had to be 
reconstructed time and again against the odds. A little more patience and circumspec-
tion among their adversaries and the war could have been wound down, rather than 
repeatedly reignited. ‘Has he [the Emperor] not sent our enemies, the Poles, a host 
of  soldiers in assistance and let his banners with the black eagle fly against Us in the 
field, and so retarded and obstructed the victory which God had given Us?’ This was 
Gustavus Adolphus’s most substantial complaint in 1629, and the act which he saw 
as evidence that the Emperor must be stopped, or ‘we will all be sent to America to 
boil sugar’. From Vienna’s perspective, it was not essential to lend a few regiments to 
troubled friends in Poland to assist against the Swedes, and the Emperor might easily 
have kept his troops at home. In short, the scale and duration of  the war depended on 
a very large number of  decisions against peace and many of  these hung in the balance.
It may simply be a coincidence that so many of  these decisions came down on the 
side of  war. Improbable things happen. However, for some stages of  the war, I think 
the infamous ability to let the war nourish itself  created a bias in decision-making. Lack 
of  resources is a major reason why people opt for peace, and this time was different. 
When armies lived partly from direct extraction, partly by accumulating debt to the sol-
diery and only partly from pay, then it became more difficult to stop than to carry on. 
This mechanism is not unique to the Thirty Years War, but this conflict seems to have 
been at a ‘sweet spot’ for this kind of  warfare. The armies were sufficiently organized 
so they could live like this without disintegration. They were also sufficiently strong to 
intimidate and enforce, but they were not so large that they could not move around and 
sustain themselves from new resources for years on end.
This argument does of  course touch on the next monstrously broad sub-question, 
on actors and structure. I am not sure there is a ‘current thinking’ on the issue. There 
is a variety of  viewpoints, perhaps because there are at least three different kinds of  
structure in history. One is material structure. The geography so dear to the Annales his-
torians, but also man-made objects. The material world circumscribes what is possible 
or reasonable to do and so creates a measure of  homogeneity and stability. We tend to 
treat material structure as background, not really a part of  history. Another is the kind 
of  structure we speak about in terms like culture, practice, groups. Cultural structure 
consists of  repetition and imitation, creating similarities in time and between people. 
It is a statistical phenomenon, however. People repeat themselves, but sometimes they 
don’t; they learn from others, but less well than parents, preachers and teachers desire. 
Stability and homogeneity are not immutability and regimentation. This is easily seen 
in many studies from the social sciences. When these seek to measure the strength of  
statistical regularity, it is always rather low. Economists find that individual consumers 
or producers do not obey the ‘laws’ of  the market well. Market forces are still important 
on the average, in the long term, because they do act with some strength on most actors 
and the aberrations average out, but they do not offer a precise description or exact 
forecast. The same can be seen in studies of  culture. A third kind of  historical structure 
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is organizational, as exemplified by armies, states, churches, workplaces, households. 
Organization creates roles where different people tend to behave in the same way. 
Persuading them to do so is a goal in the case of  subordinates and subjects. But organ-
ization also creates roles where individual variation is magnified into social importance, 
affecting commanders, communicators, even ordinary people who happen to be in a 
crucial place at a crucial time. Organizational structure can be used to enforce cultural 
regularity, but it also creates a platform for massive disruption.
In other words, the relationship between structure and actor resembles the rela-
tionship between the weather forecast and the weather. It is legitimate to extract the 
element of  regularity from an essentially chaotic process, and it may be a very true de-
scription on a certain level of  generalization, but a truthful sunny forecast does not pre-
clude a little shower on your picnic. The Thirty Years War, like any conflict, consisted 
of  organized attempts to influence what others did and, especially, to disrupt them in 
the case of  the enemy. Innumerable individual decisions were magnified in importance 
by the organization of  war. The impact on others made their acts, thoughts and fates 
less regular and predictable, and so less structured. In this way, the Thirty Years War 
demonstrates how different kinds of  structure in history may impact negatively on each 
other, and studying large and complex slices of  history like this conflict is necessary for 
understanding the interaction between different kinds of  structural regularity.
Rizzo: Several aspects of  the Thirty Years War seem to suggest that this conflict 
was not inevitable. To begin with, on the eve of  its outbreak, most contemporaries 
were neither expecting nor preparing for a conflict, and definitely not one of  such scale 
and duration. Then, an escalation began, leading to what has been termed the ‘rapid 
internationalization’ of  the fighting. The very concept of  escalation, in itself  valuable 
to build a dynamic explanation of  strategic events, can be misleading if  misunderstood, 
insinuating that every further step is practically inescapable. Clearly, a certain degree 
of  structural constraint cannot be denied and the burden of  the past was real, but still, 
those steps were more often than not the result also of  subjective attitudes, feelings, 
views, biases and choices, and as such they can hardly be deemed inevitable. Reciprocal 
mistrust, sense of  encirclement, fear of  isolation, brinkmanship, uncertainty and lack 
of  accurate and reliable information, misperception and misjudgement under pres-
sure (all typically stemming from individual perception and decision-making)—accu-
mulatively contributed to the escalation of  the conflict, not infrequently taking actors 
far beyond their initial intentions and plans. Furthermore, it has been underlined that 
after 1628, for a couple of  years a coincidence of  factors almost merged European con-
flicts into a common ‘Armageddon’, significantly emphasizing the relevance of  seven 
momentous sieges (La Rochelle, Danzig, Stralsund, Magdeburg, Casale, Mantua, 
‘s-Hertogenbosch). Ultimately, that did not happen, while conversely it is noteworthy 
that peace between the Empire and Sweden remained possible until 1636, even if  it 
did not materialize.
‘Inevitability’ is often, if  not always, a tricky tool to handle for historians and social 
scientists, not least because it can fairly easily slip into determinism of  some kind, strong 
forms of  path dependence, overestimation of  causal chains (such as post hoc ergo propter 
hoc) and the like, inducing scholars to overlook the role of  contingency and the potential 
for individual agents to actively participate in historical processes and influence their 
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outcomes. We should also pay attention to the ambivalence of  hindsight, which is both 
helpful and deceptive. Thanks to it, on the one hand, we can count on an increased 
stock of  knowledge, which also fosters our ability to make comparisons. On the other 
hand, it might lead us to overrate necessity and structural constraints, together with 
‘strong’ attributes of  agency such as rationality, awareness or planning, while neglecting 
chance, latent functions or unintended consequences. In other words, when ‘we now 
know’ we can fruitfully rethink history, but we also run the risk of  adopting a skewed 
perspective, failing to grasp what contemporaries really knew, felt and perceived. With 
ill-conceived hindsight, a given historical situation may seem to be a foregone conclu-
sion, rather than the result of  a multifaceted and uncertain process.
Not surprisingly, from Thucydides to Karl Marx and Alexis de Tocqueville, from 
Fernand Braudel and Antonio Manuel Hespanha to Paul Kennedy, John Lewis Gaddis, 
Geoffrey Parker and beyond, the intriguing relationship between agency and structure 
has often been intensely scrutinized by historians. Provided we are well aware that 
the field of  sociology is largely different from that of  history, we might also draw on 
Anthony Giddens’s theory of  structuration, one attempt among others to move beyond 
the dualism of  structure and agency, and instead see them as mutually constitutive 
entities in constant interaction. Through the concept of  ‘duality of  structure’, Giddens 
shows how the interaction has both constraints and enabling qualities. When it comes 
to agency and structure, in most cases an et … et rather than an aut … aut approach is 
more balanced and more productive, even for historians.
2. How far was the Thirty Years War an ‘international’ war, and how 
far should it be regarded as a milestone in the development of  the inter-
national system?
Kampmann: The answer depends on what we exactly mean by international war. 
In one sense, the Thirty Years War was an international conflict from the beginning in 
that foreign powers were directly involved militarily. Nevertheless, in these early years 
of  the war it would not have been impossible for the main actors within the Empire to 
make peace, suggesting that the conflict was not yet fully ‘international’ in the 1620s. 
For example, if  the Emperor had offered the Protestant Estates peace terms after the 
Lower Saxon/Danish War (1625–1629) similar to those he later agreed at Prague in 
1635, the war could well have come to a definitive end. Of  course, I know this is a coun-
terfactual argument: the Emperor was prepared for such compromising peace terms 
only after the traumatic experience of  the years 1631 to 1634.
Nonetheless, the Treaty of  Prague shows that even confessionally or constitutionally 
firm and unbending princes like Ferdinand II or Maximilian of  Bavaria could bring 
themselves to accept peace under such conditions.
After the late 1620s, the war became irreversibly international. The German pro-
tagonists could not finish it even if  they tried. Furthermore, the Peace of  Prague, which 
was praised as a sort of  ‘national’ peace in ‘patriotic’ propaganda, was not in fact a 
‘national’, Empire-focused peace. In practice, the Emperor had to rely massively on 
Spanish support to achieve this treaty, while the exclusion of  both France and Sweden 
from the treaty doomed it. Only after ten more years and the loss of  three armies, did 
the Emperor finally accept the international character of  the war and open formal 
peace talks with both his international enemies.
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Concerning the war’s national/international character, I would point out two other 
aspects. First, all armies, including those of  the foreign powers, consisted of  a high and 
ever-growing proportion of  German soldiers. Secondly, the lines of  the opposing inter-
national alliances were not closed. For example, the Dutch Republic (being a French 
ally) made war against Spain, but never declared or made war against the Emperor 
(and vice versa). And France never declared war on the Emperor (only on Spain), and 
Sweden likewise did not fight Spain (only the Emperor).
The Thirty Years War can only be regarded as a milestone in the development of  the 
international system in a limited sense. In contrast to a frequently expressed opinion, 
the war and its concluding Westphalian peace did not bring about the notion of  equality 
among the sovereigns (Louis XIV regarded himself  superior to almost any other 
Christian monarch!) nor did it end the religious wars in Europe (only in the Empire). 
The peace did not produce a European (let alone global) ‘Westphalian System’ after 
1648. Nevertheless, the conflict marked a turning point with respect to two important 
aspects of  international politics: it demonstrated the extremely destructive and uncon-
trollable dynamics of  war in an unprecedented manner, while the manner of  its conclu-
sion indicated clearly that multilateral peace congresses could be successful. Not many 
diplomats and politicians had believed that before the Thirty Years War.
Rizzo: From my perspective, that is, the perspective of  an Italian historian focused 
on the Spanish Empire, the Thirty Years War looks like an ‘international’ war for a 
series of  reasons, the most obvious of  which is the increasingly important foreign in-
volvement. While underscoring that the conflict originally stemmed from mainly 
German and Central European causes, recent compelling studies show that both sides 
called on external aid, triggering a ‘scramble for support’ with the intervention of  
several great and medium-sized powers on multiple fronts. On a much smaller scale 
and with much less dramatic consequences, a somewhat similar dynamic had already 
emerged during the Cologne War (1583–1588): deeply concerned about the security 
of  the Spanish Road, Philip II sent troops to aid local Catholics, thus increasing foreign 
influence on Imperial politics—even more so, since the Dutch gave support to the rival 
party. Significantly enough, though, both powers practised self-restraint, since neither 
Spain nor the Netherlands aspired to continuous interference in German affairs.
This is not to say, however, that every conflict that occurred across Europe between 
1618 and 1648 is to be embedded in and totally absorbed within the Thirty Years War, 
nor that the undeniable need to connect the latter to a broader strategic picture implies 
that it was merely a part of  a ‘global’ struggle for hegemony in Europe. In this sense, 
I  believe the Thirty Years War differs to some extent from the Italian Wars (1494–
1559), which obviously had regional elements but were overwhelmingly influenced by 
the clash for European pre-eminence. Make no mistake: such a struggle indeed existed, 
just as global forces and phenomena are to be taken into account; those conflicts inter-
twined, overlapped and influenced one another in various ways; the events on a given 
front could heavily affect the developments on others, all the more so since some bel-
ligerents were simultaneously engaged in different regions. But those wars began as 
distinct conflicts and remained as such, to a large extent.
Revealingly, even the strategic collaboration between the Spanish and Austrian 
Habsburgs was as vital as it was limited, and far from comprehensive: the two branches 
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shared a number of  rationales, goals and means, but did not always agree, nor did their 
strategies necessarily coincide.
As an economic historian, I would add that the Thirty Years War was international 
also in terms of  human capital and manpower. Within the framework of  the ‘business 
of  war’ and the so-called internazionale aristocratica delle armi (international military ar-
istocracy), thousands of  officers as well as rank and file from several nationalities cir-
culated throughout Europe to serve—just think about Italians and Scots. Last but not 
least, I would mention a ‘biological’ factor. Troop movements and the influx of  soldiers 
from abroad favoured the spread of  infectious diseases, with remarkable demographic, 
socio-economic and moral consequences such as the plague that scourged Northern 
Italy in 1630/31, powerfully narrated in Alessandro Manzoni’s celebrated novel The 
Betrothed (1827).
As regards the implications for the history of  international relations, although the 
‘classic’ interpretation of  Westphalia as the defining moment for the birth of  the modern 
international order based on Weberian sovereign states is perhaps a bit timeworn, even 
among political scientists, we should not underestimate the importance of  the trea-
ties as a crucial step along the winding way towards a new system. In the wake of  a 
shocking, unprecedented bloodbath, thanks to an approach resting on at least partially 
innovative principles and methods, at the end of  the day diplomacy succeeded in pro-
viding a critical framework for peace, moderation and stability in the heart of  Europe, 
one which significantly has gone down in history as a model for future settlements.
Besides, provided we do not oversimplify complex historical processes, nor think in 
terms of  abrupt strategic rises and falls, it is fair to say that the war and the peace facili-
tated important changes in the European balance of  power. Inter alia, as the Empire’s 
heyday had passed, the Austrian Habsburgs progressively gained ground and got the 
upper hand over the Spanish branch (though the battle of  Rocroi should definitely 
not be seen as the end of  Spanish pre-eminence)—even in Italy, where Spain’s inter-
ference in the long-standing issue of  Imperial fiefs seems to have faded away. Far from 
being a full-fledged absolutist and ‘modern’ state, France nonetheless strengthened its 
international standing and strategic influence and, most importantly for France and 
the Protestant powers, the nightmare of  Catholic Habsburg hegemony in Europe had 
finally been removed.
Haude: The Thirty Years War had a number of  ‘international dimensions’. Still, 
while it took place within a broader context of  conflicts in Europe, these had their own 
respective agendas. As has been well established, the Thirty Years War was fought for 
a number of  reasons, of  which constitutional and dynastic issues rank among the most 
important, with religion an inseparable part of  the mixture. Nevertheless, the involve-
ment of  many other European powers in the conflict points to concerns that transcend 
these internal issues. The political (if  not always religious) alignment of  European 
countries and dynasties drew supporters from around the Continent into the war, and 
there is ample evidence of  fear over the Habsburg’s growing power.
This debate over the war’s wider political significance remains in flux, with the most 
intriguing thesis that advanced by Johannes Burkhardt. For him, the war represented 
a Staatsbildungskreig rather than a Staatenkrieg (a war about how a state is constituted 
rather than a war between states), but he also underscored the European dimension 
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/gh/article-abstract/36/2/252/4734960
by Bodleian Law Library user
on 22 June 2018
Forum 261
of  this conflict. In his interpretation, the war was fought over who would rule Europe. 
Eventually the French, Habsburg and Swedish visions of  empire, in which each power 
aspired to rule supreme over Europe, gave way to the compromise of  a ‘summitless 
pyramid’, with a number of  powers existing ‘side by side with equal entitlement’. 
Alongside the constitutional formation of  the Holy Roman Empire, Burkhardt placed 
concerns pertaining to the political order of  Europe as the underlying factors causing 
the war.
Just as the inevitability of  the war has come under scrutiny and criticism, so has the 
assessment of  its resolution in the Peace of  Westphalia. Earlier scholarship evaluated 
the settlement in wholly negative terms, as reverting to antiquated patterns that per-
petuated the Holy Roman Empire’s political and religious fragmentation and arrested 
Germany’s development, while nation states were blossoming elsewhere. More recently 
historians have demonstrated convincingly both the rearward- and forward-looking 
qualities of  the treaties, and have assessed them much more positively. At a time when 
nation states have lost their cachet, Germany’s political path now looks more like 
shrewd federalism than wrong-headed particularism. Moreover, scholars have high-
lighted the path-breaking legal dimensions of  the Peace of  Westphalia. In his article 
‘Der Westfälische Friede—Grundgesetz für Europa?’ in the volume Der Westfälische 
Friede (1998), edited by Heinz Duchhardt, Heinhard Steiger attributes ‘epochal sig-
nificance’ to the treaties ‘because for the first time they had succeeded by means of  
modern international law in making peace between equal powers within Europe’ and 
thus laid the ‘foundations of  the international law of  treaties in the European order for 
the next 150 years’. Importantly, these did not preclude future wars but provided a legal 
framework by which conflicts could be conducted and resolved. The fact that up until 
the modern era the Peace of  Westphalia served as the essential legal blueprint for inter-
national conflict resolution makes it a milestone in the international system.
Lind: ‘International’ is an anachronistic term, as the quotation marks in the ques-
tion already hint. It is equally anachronistic to call the Thirty Years War a ‘German 
civil war’, although the latter at least assumes a clear division between international and 
national. Still, I would not hesitate to call the Thirty Years War an international war for 
reasons of  language as well as substance. Using anachronistic terminology can never be 
off-limits on principle, but it may deserve some explanation, like obsolete terms gener-
ally do. The use of  any word is an act of  categorization, joining things which are never 
absolutely identical.
Explanations and definitions are certainly necessary, but of  course there is a point 
when lumping together is no longer helpful. I do not find that ‘international’ in the 
context of  the Thirty Years War is stretched too far, because the war has so much in 
common with other, later wars described as international, then and now. All the major 
European rulers concerned themselves with the war and most of  them participated, 
at least by supporting friends. Furthermore, these major rulers were not that different 
as military and political actors from later heads of  self-consciously sovereign states. It 
is true that this international character did not apply equally to all stages, theatres or 
actors of  the war, but this is also the case with many major conflicts later on. We do not 
doubt the international character of  the Napoleonic Wars or the Second World War 
because there were guerrillas or transnational ideological communities for instance.
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The era of  the Thirty Years War was surely a milestone in the development of  the 
classic states system. In the case I know best, the Danish state established a large per-
manent army, doubled the navy and set up permanent legations in all major states, even 
remote Spain. The tangled complexity of  rule in the duchies of  Schleswig and Holstein 
was reduced, and militant patriotism became the dominant discourse on war in print. 
In short, the Danish state approached the ideal-type European state much more than 
before, and many others did the same. All was motivated by war, and mostly by the 
Thirty Years War. In political science mythology it is of  course the Westphalian peace 
which gives birth to the modern state system, but in my opinion that treaty mattered 
little compared with the influence of  protracted war—even if  the peace did move the 
Empire a bit closer to conformity with the conditions in the rest of  Europe.
Tischer: The Thirty Years War was an international war from its very beginning 
because many of  the protagonists from inside the Holy Roman Empire were at the 
same time international players. Frederick V of  the Palatinate was when he married the 
daughter of  the king of  England, and the Bohemian estates, when they elected him as 
an anti-king, hoped that he would get support from his wide network of  fellow believ-
ers and relatives. The Habsburg dynasty, with the future Emperor Ferdinand II, was 
international in itself. The Austrian Habsburgs possessed the crown of  Hungary out-
side the Empire and were part of  the broader House of  Austria. The Habsburg kings 
of  Spain were always actors in the Holy Roman Empire too, and when the Bohemian 
Revolt broke out, they supported their Austrian relatives. The Habsburg power politics 
and the religious conflict were of  interest both inside and outside the Empire. Many 
Imperial estates traditionally pursued their own foreign policy, a practice which was 
confirmed with the Peace of  Westphalia. Thus, it was no surprise that foreign powers 
were involved in the entangled Imperial conflicts which played a role in the Thirty 
Years War, in particular when we consider that powers like the Dutch States General 
or the king of  Denmark occupied an intermediate position between foreign power and 
member of  the Holy Roman Empire.
Most of  the Imperial estates did not want to go to war against the Emperor, their 
overlord, but they nonetheless welcomed political support against an increasingly 
powerful House of  Habsburg with its threat of  a ‘Spanish slavery’. In particular, the 
Protestant estates were put more and more on the defensive by Emperor Ferdinand 
II. Although they did not invite Sweden to help them, it was definitely a relief  for the 
Protestant faith when King Gustavus Adolphus, who was related to several Protestant 
German princes, overran the Empire in 1630/31 and forced his fellow believers into an 
alliance. The intervention of  Sweden, and later of  its ally France, came in a moment 
when the struggle for the constitution and for the religious coexistence in the Empire 
was at a stalemate. Although there was a peace concluded in Prague without the foreign 
powers in 1635, the situation was not really stable and there was no political consensus 
within the Empire to back the Emperor’s calls to expel France and Sweden. Finally, 
these two powers became the main partners shaping the Peace of  Westphalia.
The idea of  the Peace of  Westphalia was not to fix a new European system. 
Nevertheless, it rearranged the relations of  some of  the leading powers and created 
the basis for future development in Europe. Moreover, the peace congress in Münster 
and Osnabrück lasted approximately five years and attracted nearly all the European 
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powers. Apart from England, which had descended into civil war, all Europe’s Catholic 
and Protestant powers joined the congress permanently or at least for a short time. 
Thus, the diplomacy and the contact between them became an important model for 
future interaction. This makes the congress definitely a milestone in international his-
tory. By its mere form, the Peace of  Westphalia was a treaty between France, Sweden 
and the Empire, a treaty that included, however, a reform of  the Empire’s constitu-
tion. The Holy Roman Empire preserved its international structure and thus became 
an international platform in Europe also for the future. This went further when the 
Imperial Diet became permanent after 1663.
3. How have the cultural turn and the use of  concepts such as ‘experi-
ence’ transformed our understanding of  the war?
Haude: Cultural turns have had a significant impact on studies of  the Thirty Years 
War. As in other fields, the linguistic turn has challenged the straightforward interpret-
ation of  texts, authors and events and promoted a more cautious and circumspect reading 
of  sources and intentions. Moreover, in the wake of  the cultural turns, many historians 
have embraced microhistory, historical anthropology and the history of  everyday life, in 
which the focus is directed away from political and constitutional history and towards the 
social and cultural experiences of  individuals and communities. Thus, war is analysed 
with regard to its effect on society. This redirection towards the war on the ground has 
also had an impact on military history, by looking beyond military strategies, logistics, 
battles, sieges and generals towards the everyday reality of  soldiers and camp follow-
ers. Besides illuminating those aspects of  history that traditional studies have largely left 
untouched, cultural turns have also afforded historians a range of  lenses through which 
to look at history anew. The spatial turn, for example, with its emphasis on the social 
construction of  space, has sensitized scholars to the importance and meaning of  space 
in historical events and processes. Closely related to this area is the history of  movement, 
exile and migration, which has stimulated novel perspectives on the war as well.
Cultural turns and the focus on ‘experience’ have added significantly to our under-
standing of  the war. While traditional studies of  the war’s origins and motives, its dem-
ography and its political and military leaders have made vital contributions to our grasp 
of  the conflict, their concern with a quite select layer of  people and a rather panoramic 
perspective can offer only limited insights. The new focus on experience opens up the 
perspective on wider segments of  the populace and illuminates the social setting of  the 
war. One may ask whether ‘experience’ is indeed accessible to us. While early mod-
ern autobiographical accounts offer rich descriptions of  the individual in his or her 
community and provide vivid reflections on perceived reality, these statements need 
to be read carefully with all the tools the linguistic turn can offer. The turns, however, 
also challenge historians to reflect on what ‘reality’ is and who defines it. The new 
approaches encourage openness to multiple realities, including the ones contemporar-
ies perceived to be true. The fact that historians can establish there was method to 
the belligerents’ aggression does not invalidate people’s perceptions and experiences of  
seemingly unending misery on the ground. Nor were contemporaries’ experiences the 
same across time and space. Connecting these manifold ‘realities’ will move us closer to 
understanding the war in its complexity.
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Rizzo: The cultural turn has offered new perspectives on the history of  warfare, 
which is all the more important for the study of  early modern European societies given 
the pervasive role that war and the military played during these centuries: experienc-
ing war deeply affected the lives not only of  the troops, but also of  many civilians. 
Therefore, by investigating the way people perceived war and passed their experiences 
down to others, we can learn more about their identities, their values and beliefs, their 
views on the role of  God in history and human life, their Weltanschauung, if  you will. 
The Thirty Years War in particular, as a defining experience for many individuals and 
communities, has benefited from new research trends. Moving away from a somehow 
more traditional ‘positivist’ approach, these research lines no longer employ sources 
mainly as means to reconstruct ‘objective facts’ (or anything like that), but rather draw 
on them as a gateway to understanding how more or less traumatic experiences were 
lived through, remembered and conveyed to others, thus contributing to depicting in-
dividual and/or collective identities and behaviours.
That said, inspired by recent developments in source criticism (for example, by Yuval 
Noah Harari) and by my own research experience, I would underline that several in-
terpretive and methodological issues need to be addressed in order to get the best out 
of  a variety of  historical sources expressing war experiences. The intricacies of  the 
diverse forms of  personal testimony have to be assessed, as well as the milieus, interests 
and motivations of  their authors. It is a fact of  life that even the most accurate and 
unbiased report of  a certain event is the result of  subjective perception, influenced, for 
example, by the cultural background of  the author. In addition, more or less wittingly 
and bluntly, a report (such as a memoir) is usually something of  a means to an end, 
be it self-promotion or self-defence, political or religious propaganda, the spread of  
the writer’s views and opinions, etc. etc. In fact, the very selection of  the events to be 
narrated and commented upon may be meaningful. Moreover, we have to ask how far 
individual experiences are typical of  wider communities, and we should never forget 
that literate and educated people are over-represented among authors of  these texts. 
As far as possible, both the contents and the style of  the source should be analysed, 
for instance searching for topoi, clichés and passages copied from other literary texts 
or media. In this respect, the fact that many such sources do not merely and straight-
forwardly record what individuals had experienced raises challenging questions about 
their credibility. The question, then, is not only: How far can we trust the source in 
order to reconstruct ‘actual’ historical reality (assuming it exists at all)? but also: To what 
degree is the source authentically autobiographical, that is to say, a ‘genuine’ expression 
of  the author’s experience and identity? How deep and distorting is the intrusion of  
other ‘external’ factors?
Kampmann: Our understanding of  the Thirty Years War has changed funda-
mentally in the last decades, and in my view, the cultural turn, and especially the new 
perspective called the ‘cultural history of  politics’ (Kulturgeschichte des Politischen), has 
influenced this transformation to a large extent by abandoning traditional master nar-
ratives. But this process had begun long before all cultural turn(s). The first import-
ant step was the departure from the traditional, basically national master narrative of  
the Thirty Years War, which shaped the common understanding of  the war from the 
nineteenth until the second half  of  the twentieth century. This narrative saw the war 
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basically as an outcome of  the steady decay and ongoing fragmentation of  the Holy 
Roman Empire, in contrast to its centralized absolutist neighbour states. This negative 
image of  the Empire has been abandoned since the 1960s. Today, no serious historian 
would maintain that the Holy Roman Empire and its structure as such was responsible 
for the war, but rather that the war was rooted in the Empire’s temporary dysfunc-
tion around 1600. Rather than constituting a national catastrophe, the survival of  the 
decentralized Empire is now regarded generally as a positive development.
However, other traditional narratives persisted until more recently, when they were 
abandoned under the influence of  the cultural turn and through a closer look at the 
semantics of  politics and at the leading principles of  historical actors and through more 
critical attention to metahistorical preconceptions. One of  these traditional claims was 
that the war should be regarded as the result of  blind religious hatred and fundamen-
talist confrontation, and that, consequently, the experience of  the conflict contributed 
to ending the confessional age. This is an interpretation which assigns the Thirty Years 
War a special place in the genesis of  enlightened European statehood. Recent research 
suggests that this picture is misleading. Religious extremism did not gain decisive influ-
ence on political decision making, but we cannot speak of  secularized politics before or 
even after 1648. Instead it was one of  the merits of  Westphalia to ban religious violence 
in the Empire despite enshrining continuing confessional diversity.
The use of  new concepts like ‘experience’ has contributed to the abandonment or 
at least modification of  traditional historiographical narratives. In the older historical 
writing, there was a tendency to differentiate between the active military or political 
elites and the passive, purely suffering population. Put simply: a contrast between ‘de-
cision makers’ (whose decisions were meticulously reconstructed) and the victimized 
ordinary population. In my view, there is a clear tendency within current research to 
overcome this simplistic dichotomy. In more recent historiography the common civil 
and military population is seen and interpreted as an actor in its own right. Research in 
this field is interested in the common experience of  the war and the reaction to military 
violence, in the (sometimes, but by no means always, hostile) coexistence of  the military 
and the civil population, in economic actions, in ways of  popular communication, the 
role of  the public etc.
Lind: The new approaches have added to perspectives, rather than transformed 
them, I would say. The history of  battles and treaties has not changed much, if  at all, 
but in a general history of  the war those aspects would be squeezed compared with one 
written fifty or one hundred years ago. One may add that our perception of  the Thirty 
Years War may have changed less than that of  many other wars. Due to the religious 
aspect and the importance of  the interaction between soldiers and civilians, issues of  
culture and of  war experience have been a prominent part of  the history of  the Thirty 
Years War from the beginning. Grimmelhausen’s autobiographical novel of  his war 
experiences, Simplicissimus, has been almost continuously in print since the seventeenth 
century. The cultural turn has thus turned the Thirty Years War into a more interest-
ing piece of  history than before, especially outside Germany. Seen from that point of  
view, the war is immensely relevant now—even for those who have not yet realized how 
relevant its political and military aspects are for understanding much contemporary 
warfare.
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Tischer: For our understanding of  the Thirty Years War it is important to recognize 
that this was not just a clash of  contrary religious beliefs or political concepts. The world 
around 1600 with its views, everyday life, expectations or mentality was very different 
from ours. The use of  force and violence was quite usual, even in daily life, and war 
was more or less accepted as normal. Moreover, religion was taken extremely seriously 
and none of  the actors had a secular concept of  the world. Therefore, a historian of  
the war should have an extended ethnological and anthropological view of  what hap-
pened. Although the Thirty Years War is part of  a long-term development of  the Holy 
Roman Empire and of  international law, I find it extremely helpful to take a look at 
various aspects of  the society from which the war emanated. Conflicts were fought out 
not just through military actions and diplomatic negotiations, but also through cultural 
representations. A Catholic procession in a Protestant environment like that in the city 
of  Donauwörth in 1606 could stir up emotions more than an exchange of  legal opinions 
which later historians might find easier to analyse because of  their rational content. At the 
Congress of  Westphalia, the quarrel over ceremonial rank was sometimes more severe 
and more difficult to resolve than claims for further territory—not because the diplomats 
and politicians were attached to vanities, but because the ceremonies represented the pol-
itical order. When we want to understand the war, we have to understand the complete 
political, social and symbolic order, the view of  the world and its perception.
It is remarkable, however, that a broader and more cultural view of  the war underlines 
much more than the differences between the early modern and the current world. There 
are issues which have been underestimated that show also the modernity of  the early mod-
ern period. Thus, the Thirty Years War was the first major conflict in which print media 
played a significant role. Episodes like the one hundredth anniversary of  the Reformation 
in 1617 or the horrible result of  the siege of  Magdeburg in 1631, when most of  the citizens 
lost their lives, became media events that made a wider public accepting of  war. Moreover, 
the cultural view gives an idea of  the role of  anthropological aspects in political history.
Cultural misunderstandings and psychological factors are crucial for every commu-
nication process. Thus, we understand much better the confrontation between France 
and the Habsburgs, for example, when we see their opposing political concepts and 
their failure of  understanding in the context of  their different cultural backgrounds, 
traditional perceptions and mutual fear. We don’t even need to look at more complex 
cultural aspects, because all and every kind of  linguistic confusion can produce serious 
effects which have only been analysed since the cultural turn. Thus today we recog-
nize fundamental differences in mentality, religion, views, society or language between 
France and Germany, or even between northern Germany and the south. Such differ-
ences intensify conflicts or even produce them, and it is evident that they did so also in 
the Thirty Years War, at a time when they were much more emphasized and when few 
people were open-minded or flexible in their views and practices.
4. What work needs still to be done and how best should that research 
be undertaken?
Haude: The emphasis on experience has enriched our understanding of  life, society 
and the military during the Thirty Years War and has shown not only commonalities, 
but also differences in how contemporaries encountered the war and its repercussions. 
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Further regional studies will help us gain a more nuanced picture that pays attention to 
local conditions and how these affected people’s experiences of  the war. This can best 
be accomplished by exploring materials in regional archives.
Furthermore, the war has been studied almost entirely with an eye towards its war-
ring religious, dynastic and political groups. The description of  tremendous damage 
was briefly challenged by S. H. Steinberg, who in the mid-twentieth century asserted 
that the war was not as ruinous as historians had claimed. Today, with a host of  local 
studies to buttress the more general conclusions, the devastating, if  varied, effect of  the 
war is an irrefutable fact. And yet the narrative of  destruction is so dominant that it has 
left almost no room for other aspects of  the war. Admittedly, we know that more remote 
places suffered less than those along the path of  troop movements, but what about areas 
that lay in the thick of  military occupation?
Ever more studies of  early modern Europe are drawing attention to impetus for co-
existence and co-operation during the age of  Reformation, which is otherwise known 
for its religious, political and social conflict. For the Holy Roman Empire, scholars 
have focused particularly on cities and territories, where different confessions existed 
and where these communities had to find ways to live together. The Thirty Years War 
has barely been considered in this regard—maybe because it stands as the conflict 
par excellence. This horrendous war, however, has more to offer than tales of  conflict. 
Peter Wilson has emphasized that, alongside fighting, negotiations for peace continued 
throughout the war. Matters of  practicality, too, induced co-operation and coexistence 
between people of  different faiths and political parties. Moreover, the continuous move-
ment of  people brought together individuals and groups of  diverse confessions not only 
in select locales, such as Augsburg, but also in countless places throughout the Empire, 
and this affords a particularly instructive perspective on issues of  coexistence in a con-
fessionally divided society.
While the devastation during the war was real, extensive and often overwhelm-
ing, situations were often more complex than the traditional master narrative allows. 
Notably, besides narratives of  the misery, contemporaries’ autobiographical accounts 
also provide glimpses of  the encounter with people from other countries, faiths and 
cultures, and relate the results of  such meetings. Sometimes their words reflect mystery, 
impatience and confusion; at other times, they manifest curiosity and an eagerness to 
‘pick the other’s brain’. Importantly, these meetings did not always end in death and 
destruction, but every so often in remarkable shows of  concern and care for others.
Kampmann: One of  the most durable legacies (or rather ‘burdens’) of  the older 
national historiography is the concentration on the first half  of  the war, before 1635, 
with its defining ‘heroic’ or ‘tragic’ figures like Gustavus Adolphus und Wallenstein. 
Even more recent general surveys continue to stress these years disproportionally. Such 
a view is actually untenable historically, since these later years were of  course decisive 
for the outcome of  the war: just imagine what neglecting the period after 1916 would 
mean for our historical image of  World War I, or of  the years after 1943 for that of  
World War II. Moreover, the concept that 1648 has to be regarded as a total historical 
break, as a ‘zero hour’, has been questioned for good reasons. On the contrary, many 
political, diplomatic, military, economic and constitutional developments of  the later 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have their roots in the second half  of  the Thirty 
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Years War. For example, the Franco-Bavarian alliance which profoundly shaped the 
history of  the later Holy Roman Empire had its precursor in the close political co-
operation between these two partners in the 1640s. The same is true for the growing 
mistrust between the Dutch Republic and France. Or if  we look at military develop-
ments, we can already see indications that the foundation of  several standing armies 
of  the later seventeenth century was laid in the 1630s and 1640s. We can observe 
similar developments with respect to the economy or to demography with, for example, 
Hamburg’s rise as a dynamic, commercial city beginning in the second half  of  the 
Thirty Years War. Finally, similar connections can be drawn for constitutional and ju-
dicial developments, with signs that 1648 did not mark a clear break in the work of  the 
Imperial law courts. All these connections indicate the importance of  further work on 
the war’s later years. The preconditions for this are now much better than they have 
ever been. Critical editions of  sources previously focused on the earlier decades of  the 
war, but things are improving with the impressive progress of  editions like the Acta Pacis 
Westphalicae (moreover now accessible in digital format).
In my opinion, there is another area of  future research which points beyond the war 
to examine seventeenth- and eighteenth-century conflict and peacemaking compara-
tively. We know much about military structures, as well as negotiating and peacemaking 
methods during the Thirty Years War, but it would be extremely useful to compare 
these aspects both before 1618 and after 1648 with those during the war itself. For 
example, the Westphalian Congress is one of  the best investigated peace processes, 
but earlier and later peace congresses desperately need further research, and in many 
cases, there are not even critical editions of  the treaties they generated. This in turn 
would help provide innovative comprehensive explanations of  the onset, course and 
consequences of  the war to fill the gap left since the older national master narratives 
were abandoned.
Lind: I am sure the most important work to come will not be what we desire but 
what surprises us. However, I would like to learn more about the Thirty Years War as 
a Europeanizing process. We know something about the ‘military diaspora’ moving 
people and influences during the war, but a lot less about the numerous other migrants 
and displaced persons. Organized military movement did also increase in geographical 
range. Denmark saw the first army from outside the Scandinavian-Baltic area since 974, 
during the reign of  Emperor Otto, and the first ever foreign fleet. All this exemplifies 
how large-scale European political interaction was becoming much more important. 
The war years saw a massive increase in printed news, including the first regular news-
papers, nourished by these interesting times. Battling with others is perhaps not the best 
way to achieve European integration, but it creates a kind of  community.
Tischer: First of  all, we still know very little about the postwar generations. Since 
World War II we have realized that a big war leaves traces on those who survive and 
even on their children and grandchildren. Such traces can be found in the politics of  
the late 1640s and of  the 1650s, when many politicians were extremely nervous about 
security and how to stabilize the Peace of  Westphalia. This might have made them 
unable to recognize new constellations and to react properly, but the shared anxiety 
helped overcome religious differences, at least in politics. There are solid detailed stud-
ies on some of  the political events after the Peace of  Westphalia, for example on the 
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Execution Diet by Antje Oschmann, on the Imperial Diet of  1653/54 by Andreas 
Müller, and on the next long-term assembly, the Deputation Diet of  1655–1663, by 
Matthias Schnettger, but there is still no overview of  the political history of  the postwar 
Empire as such, not to mention a study on the society of  this time, which admittedly 
would be much more difficult to write. I think that a closer look at the first postwar dec-
ades and more specifically at how people at that time regarded the war would improve 
our understanding of  subsequent German history, of  the consequences of  this war and 
of  big wars in general. The Thirty Years War left traces not only in politics, in the con-
stitution and in institutions, but also in art, literature, mentality and the development of  
the population. Benigna von Krusenstjern and Hans Medick organized a conference 
the proceedings of  which were published in 1999 and give a good idea how such a new 
approach to the war and its aftermath could be implemented. Such an approach should 
be interdisciplinary and include a wide range of  sources, such as legal records or per-
sonal testimonies, which have not yet been analysed in the context of  the war. I hope 
that one day we will see a history of  postwar Germany or Europe that helps to under-
stand better how the Thirty Years War influenced this future development.
I think, however, that besides a renewed history of  postwar Germany we also need 
one for prewar society. The war’s violence is usually linked to the military system dur-
ing the conflict, but we should not underestimate the importance of  broader social 
characteristics. I am currently reading the diary of  Wolfgang Ammon, a Franconian 
pastor who wrote an account of  his life before and during the war and was eventually 
killed when the Imperial army conquered his hometown. This document of  ordinary 
life in the German countryside gives an idea of  just how harsh life was even before the 
war. Violence, hunger and misery were always a part of  it. We should ask what the war 
meant for this society and how far this violent, non-secular society underpinned the 
war’s outbreak.
There is, however, a lot of  further work to do. One important task is to synthesize 
the large number of  different regional and single-case studies. In their important re-
cent monographs, Christoph Kampmann and Peter Wilson rightly put the focus on 
the long-missing European perspective and stimulated fresh discussion. This does not 
mean, however, that the history of  the Thirty Years War as a German conflict has 
come to an end. Existing research reflects the situation of  Germany with its multitude 
of  territories and regions and it is still a challenge to bring the various results together.
Rizzo: Given the extreme complexity of  the Thirty Years War, its far-reaching 
implications and outstanding importance within German and European history, it is 
not surprising that a great deal of  research has already been undertaken, but much 
remains to be done in various fields. Since the other colleagues participating in the 
panel are far more competent than I am about this Forum’s German ‘core business’, 
I will not attempt a comprehensive wish list, so to speak, but instead I will focus briefly 
on current historiography concerning Italy and the war, before sketching a desirable 
scenario for a set of  studies to be undertaken in the near future, with specific regard to 
research topics that are of  particular interest to me.
Although the Italian Peninsula can hardly be labelled the main battleground of  the 
Thirty Years War, according to Gregory Hanlon the latter was the most important 
event in Italian history between the Council of  Trent and the French Revolution, and it 
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deserves a lot more attention than has been devoted so far. It must be said, actually, that 
in recent years a few scholars have at least begun to fill the gap: I refer, in particular, to 
Davide Maffi’s seminal monograph on Spanish Lombardy and Gregory Hanlon’s trail-
blazing studies on the Duchy of  Parma. Taking the cue from such works, as well as from 
a much wider international bibliography, other Italian territories should be investigated 
in depth, starting from a thorough survey of  local archives and libraries in search of  
brand-new or at least still-unexplored primary sources (significantly enough, for ex-
ample, the spark for Hanlon’s monograph on Parma in the fateful biennium 1635–
1637 was provided when he came across unparalleled company rosters in the Archivio 
di Stato di Parma). Building on this documentary evidence, a wide range of  research 
issues should be addressed with a coherent and multifactorial approach. For instance, 
diplomacy and broader international strategic developments should be connected to 
logistics and troop movements in the Peninsula, and to their hefty implications for local 
communities in terms of  demographic, socio-economic and political disruption, whilst 
not forgetting that they also brought a vast array of  economic and financial opportuni-
ties for both soldiers and civilians. Moreover, the resilience of  the localities struck by 
war also deserves attention. The recruitment of  troops, together with their circulation 
across the Peninsula and the Continent, is another key subject, all the more so since it 
could stimulate co-operation among scholars from different countries working on dif-
ferent war fronts. Clearly, these are only a few themes among a great many more which 
should be explored sooner rather than later. When it comes to historical research about 
Italy and the Thirty Years War, the best is (hopefully) yet to come.
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